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Abstract
This paper investigates the relationship between access to micro-credit and tem-
porary seasonal migration, an issue which is largely ignored in the standard rural-
urban migration literature. Seasonal migration due to agricultural downturns is a
common phenomenon in developing countries. Using primary data from a cross-
sectional household survey from the northwest part of Bangladesh, this study quan-
tifies the factors that influence such migration decisions. Among other results, we
find that network effects play a significant role in influencing the migration deci-
sion, with the presence of kinsmen at the place of destination having considerable
impact. Seasonal migration is a natural choice for individual suffering periodic
hardship, however the strict weekly loan repayment rules of Micro-credit Insti-
tutes can have an adverse effect on this process, reducing the ability of borrowers
to react to a shock. Our result suggests that poor individuals prefer the option of
not accessing the Micro-credit and opt for temporal seasonal migration during the
lean period. The results have numerous potential policy implications, including
the design of typical micro-credit schemes.
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1 Introduction
In the standard rural-urban migration literature, scholars primarily focus on perma-
nent internal migration and its economic, social and demographic significance. Very
few studies have discussed temporary internal migration, which is variously known
as ‘seasonal migration’, ‘circular migration’, or ‘oscillatory migration’. Evidence of this
phenomenon exists in many regions and particularly in the developing countries.1 Peo-
ple move from rural areas to nearby cities or towns for a short period of time during
lean periods in an attempt to survive and maintain their family in such difficult times.
Lean periods can occur as a result of agricultural downturn and temporary migration is
an important livelihood strategy for a large number of poor rural people in developing
countries.
In the case of seasonal downturns, a person may prefer a temporary move to a per-
manent one because such a decision offers an opportunity to combine village-based ex-
istence with urban opportunities. Faced with highly seasonal labor demand, villagers
may see temporary migration to urban areas as a relatively practical and rational strat-
egy to cope with seasonal downturns. The most important factor that results in a tem-
porary move rather than a permanent one, however, is the reversal of the urban-rural
wage differential that occurs during the peak labor demand season in the agricultural
sector.
Evidence from different countries suggests that the temporary mobilization of labor
from rural to urban areas has important socio-economic implications. Migration re-
duces the inequality in the rural area due to the flow of remittances from the migration
destinations. This flow, which is quite regular, is unlikely to occur with permanent rural
to urban migration, and such a flow has a large impact on rural families who through
this money can afford the necessities of life. Return migrants may also diffuse ideas,
information and knowledge which might play a vital role in the rural development
process.
Temporary migrants, however, cause congestion and other social problems in ur-
ban areas, and policy makers have insufficient information about the number of people
migrating temporarily to tackle these problems. Seasonal migrants are very difficult to
detect and the definition is not a clear one; hence, they are typically excluded from na-
tional surveys. As a result, it is difficult to implement effective policies to accommodate
seasonal migrants.
Seasonal migration, which is mainly caused by seasonal hardship, is quite common
among the agri-based people of Northwest Bangladesh. The rural life of Bangladesh
very much revolves around the agricultural cycle. As a consequence of this cycle, two
major seasonal deficits occur, one from late September to early November and the other
from late March to early May. With the widespread expansion of Boro cultivation, the
incidence of the early summer lean period has significantly declined. However, the au-
1For Africa see Elkan (1959, 1967) and Guilmoto (1998); for Asia see Hugo (1982), Stretton (1983), Desh-
ingkar and Start (2003), Rogaly et al. (2002) and Rogaly and Coppard (2003); and for South America see
Deutsch et al. (2003).
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tumn lean season that comes after the plantation of the Aman crop still affects almost
all parts of the country, and especially the northwest part of Bangladesh. Almost no
alternative agricultural activity persists in that period, and the non-firm sector is insuf-
ficient to absorb the seasonal unemployed labor. In local terms, this lean season is called
Monga or Mora Karthik (Rahman and Hossain 1991). During the lean season, such lack
of income and alternative means for earnings limit the purchasing power of the people,
which cannot be mitigated by with minuscule amount of assets and savings of poor
households. Despite the existence of widespread safety net programs in Bangladesh,
the seasonal hardship is still quite robust which seems to indicate that such safety net
programs are not adequate to tackle a situation like Monga.2 Access to credit is another
issue that can also amplify the problem of seasonal hardship in this region. As Khand-
ker et al. (2010) point out, most of the northwest region does not have functional credit
market and people are sometimes exposed to an informal credit market arrangement
which is locally known as ‘Dadan’ where one has to make an advance sell of labor and
crops for immediate access to food and money.
Micro-credit can be another option whereby the poor can access micro-credit to en-
gage in non-firm activities, thereby not suffering from the seasonality of the agricultural
sector, but such an option is not adequate for many ultra-poor households for mainly
two reasons. Firstly, the non-firm sector in northern Bangladesh is highly dependent
on the agricultural sector which is subject to seasonality, and secondly, the micro-credit
provided by the Micro-finance Institutes (MFIs) mostly have inflexible contracts, high
interest rates and strict loan repayment rules (such as, a weekly payment that starts
after one week of loan disbursement and weekly meeting schedules). In situations like
lean period shocks, where migration is a natural response, the strict weekly loan repay-
ment rules of MFIs can have an adverse effect on this process, reducing the ability of
borrowers to react to a shock.
To address the factors influencing the seasonal migration decision and the impact
of micro-credit on seasonal migration, this paper uses a primary dataset collected from
the northern part of Bangladesh.3 The study team chose the Kurigram district of north-
ern Bangladesh because of its distinctive features. Kurigram is mainly an agri-based,
severely poverty-stricken area and has micro-credit coverage provided by MFIs. Due
to the agricultural cycle, farmers have very little work to do on the farms after the plan-
tation of the Aman in September-October.4 As a result, a large number of agricultural
workers become jobless every year and decide to migrate temporarily. Such migrants
tend to get work in the urban informal sector and work mainly as day laborers or street
vendors. Although the urban standard of living is typically a bare minimum for these
migrants, they prefer this option to staying in the village with no income at all.
2Safety net programs that are quite regular in Bangladesh are mainly food-for-work, cash transfer, old-
age benefit, food coupons, vulnerable group feeding and public work program.
3This random cross-section household survey was conducted in January 2006 by Abu Shonchoy, Abu
Z. Shahriar, Sakiba Zeba and Shaila Parveen as part of a project undertaken by the Economics and Social
Sciences Research Group (ESSRG) of BRAC University, Bangladesh.
4In more than 80% of the farms in the study area, only one (Aman paddy) or two crops (Aman and
Boro paddy) are produced annually.
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The aim of this paper is to better understand the causes of seasonal migration and
to evaluate the characteristics of such migrants during the lean season. In doing so,
this paper makes two noteworthy contributions on the existing literature of migration.
Firstly, it quantifies the factors influencing the temporary seasonal migration during
the lean period in Bangladesh. Secondly it establishes a link between prior access to
micro-credit on the seasonal migration decision. This is an issue which has great policy
relevance, yet is largely overlooked in the literature.
2 Background
2.1 Seasonal Migration
Seasonal migration can be seen as an effective strategy for consumption-smoothing
(Rosenzweig and Stark 1989), risk diversification (Stark and Levhari 1982; Katz and
Stark 1986) or as a means to overcome credit constraints for source households (Lucas
1987; Stark 1991). In the model of Todaro (1969), individuals migrate if their expected
earnings from migration are higher than staying, but such a decision is dependent on
the individual’s human capital which might influence their earning capacity and prob-
ability of obtaining a job in the migration destination. Modern labor market literature
argues that migration could be a family decision in which having a family member mi-
grate elsewhere is a useful strategy to manage uncertainty, relieve liquidity constraint
and diversify the income portfolio (Stark 1991) whereas a notable number of papers
conceive migration as an individual decision to maximize income (Navratil and Doyle
1977; Nakosteen and Zimmer 1980, among others).
2.2 Reasons for Seasonal Migration
Other than social issues such as family structures, social customs and religious beliefs,
economic factors are the most influential reasons for migration in the lean period. Elkan
(1959, p. 192) refers to these non-economic factors as ‘most unlikely to be the whole
story, and...it can never be the most important part of the story.’ By contrast, Elkan
denoted the economic factors as being ‘largely a rationalization of simple economic
motives’ (p.192). In this section we primarily focus on the economic factors that lead to
migration (rural to urban) and reverse migration (urban to rural).
2.2.1 Reasons causing rural to urban migration
During the lean period, the temporary mobility of labor provides some means of liveli-
hood in urban areas. There are four main reasons why families take such decisions in
the lean period. Firstly, it is always easier and cheaper to survive in the rural environ-
ment than in urban areas, as the prices of food grains and other household essentials
are relatively cheaper. In most cases, it is the head or the most capable members of the
household, who are mainly men, who migrate to urban areas. Moving away from the
4
household, a single person can cope better with urban life and typically survives on a
bare minimum to enable them to send remittances back to the family.
Secondly, seasonal unemployment in agriculture causes an excess supply of un-
skilled or semi-skilled workers in rural areas. In combination with this, food grains
and other necessary commodities become relatively expensive during this period as
the affluent in these regions hoard a large amount of crops in good times to sell in the
lean period at a high price; hence, the increase in price reduces the real wage of workers.
It becomes almost impossible for an ordinary agricultural worker to maintain general
living standards during the lean period in a village and thus they choose to migrate.
In recent years, much public and private investment has been concentrated in urban
areas in developing countries. Little or no effort has gone into creating effective non-
agricultural sectors in rural areas and few alternative means of earning exist in rural
areas other than agriculture and agri-based industries. This pattern of temporary labor
movement is purely a response to the lack of alternatives in rural areas (Hugo 1982).
Finally, the cost of the journey to migration destinations is usually very small and
unimportant for migrants. As mentioned in Hugo (1982, p. 73) ‘travel costs, time taken,
and distance traversed between origin and destination generally constitute a minor el-
ement in a mover’s overall calculus in deciding whether or not to migrate and where’.
The recent improvement in communication in third world countries has also signifi-
cantly reduced the cost of movement (Afsar 1999). Moreover, access to an informal
credit market (through micro-credit schemes operated by MFIs) gives migrants the op-
tion of borrowing which can reduce their immediate relocation and travel costs. Al-
though MFIs do not run specific programs to provide credit for migration, however, it
is possible to use a loan taken by other members of the family and repay the loan once
work has been found at the migration destination.
2.2.2 Reasons causing reverse migration
There are some interesting facts which influence migrants to return to the village, caus-
ing reverse migration. Once a move to urban areas has taken place, there are some
off-setting factors such as forgone skills and income in the normal season, which are
quite important for reverse migration (Mendola 2008). Poverty and resource constraints
make it extremely difficult for a migrant to devote resources to building or to investing
in the skills that are required for formal urban job markets; hence, seasonal migrants
end up seeking jobs in the urban informal sector where the wage is typically at a min-
imum and working conditions are not pleasant. The informal sector is primarily low-
skilled and usually involves manual labor (such as the job of rickshaw puller, street
vendor or day laborer). The wages are inadequate to support a single man, let alone a
family. These people live in the slums or on the pavements of the large train stations or
sometimes by the side of street; such living conditions are worse than they have in the
villages. Lack of job security, ineffective labor unions and illness-related insecurity also
play a role in reverse migration. Seasonal migrants are generally not protected against
accidents and do not have provision for retirement benefit (Elkan 1959). If a migrant be-
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comes ill or requires money, they can seek help in the village which provides some sort
of social security through the widespread network of social relations, which provides
an incentive for migrants to return (Hugo 1982).
In the lean period, large numbers of people may leave the village to seek jobs in the
urban sector, leading to an excess supply of labor. Employers usually exploit this by
decreasing the wage rate below the standard market rate. Moreover, employers know
that migrants are temporary workers, hence there is no incentive for them to provide
training or invest in this short-term labor force. The lack of formal or skill-based educa-
tion ensures that most migrant workers remain unskilled, making it extremely difficult
for them to seek jobs in the formal urban labor market.
The most important economic factor leading to reverse migration is the reversal
of the rural-urban wage difference. For a temporary migrant, the income in the rural
sector during the normal time is typically more than the urban sector. As a result, there
is an obvious incentive for migrants to return to rural areas in the normal period after
the shock.
2.3 Factors Influencing the Migration Decision
A number of studies have analyzed the internal migration pattern in Bangladesh but
are mostly qualitative analysis.5 We also find some studies on circular migration such
as Breman (1978), Hugo (1982), Stretton (1983), Chapman and Prothero (1983), Rogaly
et al. (2002); Rogaly and Coppard (2003), Deshingkar and Start (2003), and Deutsch et al.
(2003). Broadly, these studies focus on issues such as the scale and pattern of migration,
the characteristics or selectivity of the migrants, causes of migration, the impacts of
internal migration on urbanization and the pattern of resource transfer followed by
rural-urban migration. As we could not find sufficient studies on the factors influencing
the seasonal migration decision, we have used the variables that are generally used
which are found to be significant for internal rural to urban migration studies.
The literature shows that internal migration is most common among younger mem-
ber of the population (Borjas 2000; Mendola 2008). Demographically, the internal mi-
grants of Bangladesh are mostly young adults (Chowdhury 1978) and temporary mi-
grants are even younger than permanent ones (Afsar 2002) which is perhaps not sur-
prising since the demographic pattern of the population of Bangladesh is quite young in
comparison with western countries. Hugo (1982) argued that men have a significantly
greater tendency to seasonally migrate than women. Due to limited employment op-
portunities, family responsibilities and for religious reasons, female members of a fam-
ily are less likely to migrate than adult male members. Previous empirical works on
migration suggested that household size positively influences an individual’s migra-
tion decision (Deshingkar and Start 2003; Mendola 2008). Hence, a positive influence
of household size on migration decision has been hypothesized.
5For reference, see for example Chowdhury (1978), Khan (1982), Huq-Hussain (1996), Begum (1999), Is-
lam (2003), Hossain (2001), Barkat and Akhter (2003), Afsar (1999, 2003, 2005), Kuhn (2001, 2005), Shahriar
et al. (2006).
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Interestingly, the relationship between land holding and the migration decision in
empirical studies is inconclusive and ambiguous. For example, Kuhn (2005) argues
that the land-holdings of households is a key determinant of rural-urban migration
and the tendency to migrate will be greater for those who hold less land. Similarly, the
recent work of Mendola (2008) finds a negative and significant relationship between
land holding and migration decisions for temporary migrants in Bangladesh. Hossain
(2001), in contrast, finds that the tendency to migrate is higher for households with
some sort of land holding compared to the landless. Hence, it will be interesting to
explore the role of asset holding (in the form of land) in determining the seasonal mi-
gration decision of the poor in lean period.
The importance of a strong support network is crucial for the immigrants (Munshi
2003; McKenzie and Rapoport 2007) as well as for the migrants (Afsar 2002; Brauw and
Harigaya 2007). Social networks offer support in the provision of accommodation, relo-
cation, learning new skills, better bargaining power and protection against harassment,
assault and uncertainties. Afsar (2003) found that 60 percent of the internal migrants
who have kinsmen at the place of destination managed to find employment within a
week of arrival in Dhaka city. Hence, the presence of kinship at the place of destination
is expected to have a higher influence on the tendency toward seasonal migration.
3 Micro-credit and Seasonal Migration
Micro-credit can play an important role as a determinant in making decisions about
seasonal migration. Micro-credit provided by micro-finance institutions (MFIs) is a
recent policy development in developing countries in relation to poverty alleviation.
It is argued that if given access to relatively small credits, entrepreneurs from poor
households will find opportunities to engage in viable income-generating activities that
are often secondary to their primary occupation, and thus alleviate their poverty by
themselves. Micro-credit is accessible in rural areas through MFIs that have expanded
quite rapidly in recent years. According to the Micro-credit Summit Campaign, Micro-
finance institutions had 154,825,825 clients as of December 2007, of which more than
100 million were women. In 2006, Mohammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank were
awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace for their contribution to the reduction of poverty,
especially in Bangladesh. However, among academics there is so far no consensus on
the impact of micro-credit on income improvement and poverty reduction (Banerjee
et al. 2009).
Typically, MFIs provide small loans to poor people who are deprived of access to
credit offered by regular banks. Through the introduction of ‘social collateral’, MFIs
give individual loans to villagers in groups and hold the group jointly liable for repay-
ment. If any group member defaults, the entire group is punished by being denied
future loan applications. This group mechanism creates peer pressure and solidarity,
which is reported to work well in societies where social networks and bonding are of
vital importance. The repayment success rate of MFIs is quite high and in Bangladesh,
for example, the repayment rate has never dropped below 90 percent (Develtere and
7
Huybrechts 2005).
No specific micro-credit program targeted only to tackle the seasonal hardship dur-
ing the Monga period; nevertheless individuals could always take micro-credit or ac-
cess micro-credit during the normal season through their family members, if they could
fulfill the eligibility criteria. In this way, individuals can use micro-credit during the
productive part of the year and use the increased income to address their consumption
and income shortfalls during the lean season. The major drawback of the micro-credit
framework is the rigid loan repayment rule whereby almost all contracts are fixed in
their repayment schedules, which entails constant equal weekly payments with a high
interest rate (usually 20%). The members of MFIs are poor rural people who frequently
have uncertain income, making it very difficult for them to maintain such rigid weekly
loan repayments. In a lean period especially, when there is no job availability in the
rural agricultural sector, it is extremely difficult for the poor to generate income, let
alone comply with their loan repayment scheme. Such strict repayment schedules pre-
vent people with prior access to micro-credit from migrating, thus making it very hard
for them to repay their weekly installments and survive. Families, however, may by-
pass such strict loan repayment rules by combining both migration and micro-credit by
means of the credit being received by the female member of the household but used by
the male member who migrates to the urban areas during the lean season and sends
remittances to repay the loan. Not everybody in the population, however, has capable
family members to take the loan and there exists a sizable number of female-headed
households, elderly people and disabled people who will be restricted to migrate if they
have taken credit and may not like to access the micro-credit. Moreover, the amount of
loan available through micro-credit is very limited because it is based on the borrower’s
ability to repay in their worst week (Karlan and Mullainathan 2009). The impact of hav-
ing prior access to micro-credit on seasonal migration therefore has important policy
implications for the poor who are affected by seasonality in the agricultural sector.
4 Data Description
The empirical analysis of this study is based on the primary household survey of 290
households from 17 villages in four selected thanas6 of the Kurigram district: Chilmari,
Ulipur, Rajarhat and Kurigram. The survey team collected the primary data of this
study from Kurigram where approximately 46% of the total labor force is involved in
agriculture (they work in their own firm); another 30% are agricultural day laborers
(Banglapedia 2006). The survey covered 17 villages from the four thanas: four from
Chilmari, three from Rajarhat, four from Ulipur and six from the Sadar thana. Although
the villages from each thana were selected randomly, the four thanas were selected to
capture heterogeneity in income, communication, infrastructure facilities, exposure to
catastrophe and other sociocultural factors.
6A thana is a unit of police administration. In Bangladesh, 64 districts are divided into 496 thanas.
There are ten thanas in the Kurigram district.
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The survey showed that people living in Ulipur and Chilmari were relatively poor
compared to those living in Rajarhat. The survey team observed that Kurigram Sadar
and Rajarhat had better transportation systems compared to Chilmari and Ulipur, so
the ability to move is relatively higher in those areas. A char7 area was also surveyed in
the Kurigram Sadar to capture the special characteristics of char livelihood in relation
to the migration decision in the lean period. Among the four thanas, the history of
these areas suggests that Rajarhat suffers the least during natural disasters. In contrast,
Chilmari is the worst affected by both flood and river erosion. River erosion is quite
rare in Ulipur, although annual floods ravage the area. The char area is affected by
river erosion and floods quite regularly. The Kurigram town is also affected by river
erosion.
According to Banglapedia (2006) the population of Kurigram district is 1,782,277,
of which 49.62% are male and 50.93% are female. The majority of the population are
Muslim; as a result, only minor religious and cultural heterogeneity exists in the survey
area and is negligible. The people of this region are largely illiterate, with an average
literacy rate of around 22.3%. The survey area consists of 37.02% of the total population
of the district.
The survey was conducted among 290 random individuals who are the heads of
their representative households. The survey questionnaire was trialed on 30 respon-
dents in Chilmari and Ulipur before being used for the main survey. The final ques-
tionnaire consisted of 12 sections and was designed to collect individual information on
the migration decision and factors influencing this decision. The survey sought general
information such as age, occupation, average income and the number of dependents.
The questionnaire also addressed issues of land usage, occupation at destination if they
migrated, micro-credit membership and land ownership. The questionnaire collected
information on the nature and extent of starvation throughout the year, information
on natural disasters, death of earning family members and sudden damage to crops or
livestock.
The survey team collected the data at the beginning of the normal period when all
the migrants had just returned from urban areas. Of the 290 respondents, 68 percent
were identified as seasonal migrants. The variables were categorized into three groups;
representing economic factors, ecological vulnerabilities and personal characteristics.
We were not confident that individuals could predict future plans for seasonal mi-
gration and we therefore asked respondents about their immediate past migration be-
havior and income. To capture the seasonal migration behavior of the respondents, we
used a dummy variable which has a value of one if the respondent migrated in the last
lean period and zero otherwise.
With 1200 micro-credit institutions and 19.3 million members, the micro-credit sec-
tor of Bangladesh is one of the largest in the world. According to the Credit and De-
velopment Forum Bangladesh (Credit and Development Forum 2006), approximately
37% of all households in Bangladesh have access to micro-credit. Credit does not re-
quire any collateral and is given to both individuals and groups. The major types of
7A char is a small river island created by silt deposits and estuaries.
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FIGURE 1: Average district specific distribution of seasonal hardship, migration, access to
micro-credit (in percentage)
loans include general loans, program loans and housing loans. However, at the time
of the survey there was no micro-credit program that was solely designed to tackle the
seasonality due to Monga. Furthermore, the Micro-finance Institutes (MFIs) have only
moderate coverage in the survey area even though the northern part of Bangladesh is
known for its grievous incidence of extreme poverty as well as for the acute seasonality
of agricultural downturn. We measured the access to micro-credit through MFIs by a
dummy variable, which is coded as one for having access to micro-credit (both directly
if the respondent took the credit and indirectly in the case other family members hav-
ing taken the credit through MFIs) and zero otherwise. In the survey, only 19% of the
respondents have access to micro-credit.
The variable used to capture the seasonal starvation during the lean period is termed
as seasonal hardship, which is a dummy variable that equals one if the individual has
one meal or less on a typical day in the lean period. In the sample, 60 percent of the
respondents reported that they had one or less than one meal during the lean period
which shows the severity of the seasonal starvation in the survey area. Fig. 1 reports the
average seasonal hardship, access to micro-credit and migration by survey thanas.8 It is
evident from the figure that seasonal hardship is higher in the Chilmari and Ulipur dis-
trict compared with the other two districts. By contrast, people from Kurigram Sadar
and Chilmari have more incidents of seasonal migration than other thanas. However,
access to micro-credit is the highest in Rajarhat while the other thanas have an almost
equal level of response.
[Table 2 about here]
8In the Figure 1 Kurigram is used instead of Kurigram Sadar for simplicity
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More males than females were interviewed (89 percent versus 11 percent). Patriar-
chal village societies account for such a small female response rate. Some 70 percent of
the respondents reported being married at the time of the survey, which is quite a high
number. A simple dummy variable is used to indicate land ownership. An respondent
is assigned a value of one if his/her family owns any amount of cultivable land, irre-
spective of the size. Otherwise, he/she is assigned a value of zero. 43 percent of the
respondents reported that they were landless.
A dummy variable was also used to capture information on education. An individ-
ual having some reading ability was given a value of one and zero otherwise. In the
present sample, 42 percent of the respondents have at least some education. Interest-
ingly, 63 percent of the respondents reported having some prior migration experience,
and 52 percent of the respondents had kinsmen at the urban centers at the time of sur-
vey.
5 Econometric Models
5.1 Econometric Model of Migration and access to Micro-credit
To model the effect of micro-credit on the determinants of seasonal migration, the is-
sue of endogeneity becomes relevant since individual’s decision to take micro-credit is
endogenous to the migration decision. The problem lies in the fact that the individuals
who have access to micro-credit (treatment) are self selected individuals which is influ-
enced by idiosyncratic and unobserved individual characteristics. Moreover, such un-
observed individual characteristics (for example, an individual’s entrepreneurial ability
or level of risk aversion) may drive both the treatment variable and the outcome (mi-
gration decision). Furthermore, there might have some unobserved preference which
could affect an individual’s decision to take micro-credit and simultaneously her deci-
sion to migrate.
Since there is no availability of natural or randomized data, this paper employs a
structural model which is estimated by the bivariate endogenous treatment model (oth-
erwise known as recursive bivariate probit; for example see (Maddala 1983, p. 123) and
(Greene 2002, p. 823)) in which we jointly estimate the determinants of the access to
micro-credit and the micro-credit impact on the determinants of seasonal migration.
Such a model belongs to family of the simultaneous equation models with endogenous
variable (both discrete and continuous) first introduced by Heckman (1978) and further
developed by Maddala (1983). As mentioned in Jones (2007), according to the frame-
work defined in Blundell and Smith (1993), this kind of model is termed as a type II
model which is in our case the household’s prior access to micro-credit is assumed to
influence individual’s migration decision during the lean period.9 In our study, we are
more interested in identifying the impact of household’s prior access to micro-credit on
9The chronology of these events means that the current migration decision cannot have a direct feed-
back effect on the access to micro-credit in the previous year, since micro-credit is mostly taken by females
whereas migration is mostly undertaken by males which rules out the simultaneity bias.
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migration rather than the impact of the propensity to have access to micro-credit, hence
such endogenous bivariate treatment model seems more appropriate.
Formally, let us denote two simultaneous equations; one for the access to micro-
credit and the other for the seasonal migration, with correlated disturbances, which
can then be estimated with an endogenous treatment model using FIML methods. Fol-
lowing Angrist and Pischke (2009) the general specification for a two equation model
is as follows:
Ci = 1[X′icγ
∗
0 + Z
′
iγ
∗
1 > εi], (1)
Mi = 1[X′imβ
∗
0 + Ciβ
∗
1 > vi]. (2)
Here Ci is the dummy for access to micro-credit and Mi is the dummy for seasonal
migration where the first dependent variable, Ci appears as an independent variable
in the second equation, which is a recursive, simultaneous equation model. Suppose
that an individual i decides to access micro-credit, directly or indirectly through family
members, by comparing the costs and benefits using a net benefit function or latent
index expressed in 1. The outcome variable in this context is the seasonal migration
decision of the same individual i which is also a latent index that can be seen as aris-
ing from a comparison of the costs and benefits of seasonal migration during the lean
season expressed in 2. Here, Xi denotes a vector of personal, household and other con-
trol variables and Zi instrumental variables. Finally, εi and vi indicate residuals, which
follow E[εi|Xic,Xim] = E[vi|Xic,Xim] = 0, Var[ε1|Xic,Xim] = Var[vi|Xic,Xim] = 1, and
Cov[εi,vi|Xic,Xim] = ρ, respectively.
The source of omitted variable bias in the bivariate probit is the correlation between
εi and vi which means that unmeasured random determinants of access to micro-credit
are correlated with unmeasured random determinants of seasonal migration. Such a
model is identified by assuming that Zi is independent of these components. Unless we
find evidence that ρ = 0, the simple probit analysis without considering this correlation
between error terms will give inconsistent parameter estimates and typical two-stage
methods will be inapplicable Maddala (1983).
For the instruments, following the seminal paper by Pitt and Khandker (1998), we
used landholding-based exclusion restrictions in which households having more than
50 decimal of land are precluded from joining any MFI micro-credit lending program.
The fundamental assumption for such an exclusion restriction is that landownership
is exogenous; moreover, MFIs mainly use landownership based primary eligible cri-
teria to proxy for unverifiable and difficult to measure income and asset holdings of
borrowers. Such a quasi-experimental identification strategy is an example of the re-
gression discontinuity design method of program evaluation which takes advantage
of a discontinuity in the program eligibility rule to identify the program treatment ef-
fect. This exclusion restriction is used to create a discontinuous household’s program
choice variable which is then interacted with the household’s observable characteristics
to instrument for the participation in the micro-credit program. The idea is that these
exogenous variables have an effect on the demand for micro-credit which depends on
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eligibility and availability but not on the outcomes of interest that is discontinuously
affected by the exogenous regressors conditional on credit program participation.
Notwithstanding, such land-based exclusion restriction is not perfect and might not
be reliable since such program participation criteria is sometimes not strictly enforced
and may not be perfectly observable. Interaction variables based on exclusion restric-
tion may not be efficient instruments (Khandker 2005); however, the dataset used in this
paper has only 1.72% of the sample that has accessed micro-finance with more than 50
decimals of land, hence such concern would not be an issue in our analysis. The es-
timations of such bivariate treatment effects must be interpreted with caution due to
the strong distributional assumptions of the error terms; in addition, the results could
be sensitive to the choice of explanatory variable and instruments. To check for the ro-
bustness of our estimations, we have estimated different models to compare with our
findings which do not have such a strict structure for the error terms.
5.2 Estimations
To avoid the identification problems in recursive bivariate probit settings, it is only
necessary to have at least one variation in the set of the exogenous regressors which
is not included in the base equation. In other words, the set of variables in Xic which
is the access to micro-credit equation (in equation 1) is partly common to the sets of
regressors in Xim but not identical. In our case, we included regional dummies in the
second equation along with a dummy variable to denote kinship at the potential place
of migration destination, which acts as a proxy for the network effect. It seems rea-
sonable to assume that having a network at the migration destination can influence the
migration decision but such a variable does not necessarily influence the micro-credit
equation. Similarly, the micro-credit coverage in our study areas were similar among
the regions and the regional differences do not play any role in explaining the micro-
credit equation. Such regional dummies are nevertheless important for the migration
equation due to the regional variation of infrastructure, communication and distance
to migration destinations.10
Table 4 presents the main findings of the recursive bivariate probit models. To esti-
mate the FIML estimations, we used STATA 11 ‘biprobit’ command which is applicable
for the recursive bivariate probit framework when one of the dependent dichotomous
variables appears as a regressor for the main probit equation (Fabbri and Monfardini
2008; Park 2009). The marginal effect of a unit change in the explanatory variables on
the decision to migrate has also been calculated. Though our preferred specification is
model 1, we have used total land holdings, marital status and seasonal hardship vari-
ables in model 2, 3 and 4 respectively to check for the robustness of the estimation.
These additional variables in model 3 and 4 (marital status and seasonal hardship)
could be potentially endogenous hence may not provide efficient estimates. We also
tested for the joint hypothesis that all the IVs are zero which has been overwhelmingly
10For the purpose of regression authenticity, we tested for the validity of such assumptions and they
pass the orthogonality requirement.
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rejected by the data.
[Table 4 about here]
The bi-probit estimates of the structural form equation show that among individ-
ual characteristics only sex plays a significant role in explaining the migration decision
which means that migration propensity is significantly higher among males. This find-
ing is consistent with the previous finding of the literature that men are more likely to
temporarily migrate than women.
The role of education in the migration decision has been widely discussed in the lit-
erature and several studies have shown that migrants are usually more educated than
non-migrants in the same locality (Chowdhury 1978; Kuhn 2005). Educated people are
more likely to migrate, because job opportunities for them are higher in the urban cen-
ters than in the rural areas; however, our estimation suggests that education has a neg-
ative impact on seasonal migration and the estimation is highly statistically significant.
Such a result is not surprising since seasonal migration is temporary in nature and, as
a result, individuals who have relatively better education will tend to choose perma-
nent over temporary migration. Temporary seasonal migrants tend to seek jobs in the
urban informal sector which does not require any formal education. Moreover, individ-
uals with better education who live in the villages mostly work in the non-agricultural
sector and are therefore less likely to be affected by the seasonality.
The network effect, captured through the kinship variable, has the strongest pos-
itive impact among all the factors influencing the seasonal migration decision and is
found to be significant at less than the 1% level. Kinship at the place of destination
reduces the cost of migration by minimizing the time for job searching. In the case of
seasonal migration, a risk averse individual will reduce his/her risk by having some
degree of network at the place of migration destination, otherwise it will be very hard
for the individual to get a job in the urban areas. If a person does not find a job in
the urban area, s/he will be worse off in the urban area than from the rural area as
temporary seasonal migration incurs some economical and social costs. As a result,
an individual who takes the decision to seasonally migrate in the lean period will be
heavily influenced by the network factor.
All the models reported in Table 4 fit the data well (for example, in model 1, χ2(25) =
699.44, p < 0.000) and all of the statistically significant parameters are consistent and
coherent throughout different specifications. The access to micro-credit and migration
decision have been jointly determined in which the correlation coefficient of the error
terms ρ is statistically different from zero, where the estimate of ρ in model one is−0.85
with a standard error of 0.16. The Wald statistics for the test of the hypothesis that ρ = 0
is 4.59. For a single restriction, the chi-squared critical value is 3.84, so the hypothesis
that ρ = 0 is soundly rejected. The likelihood ratio test for the same hypothesis leads
to a similar conclusion, which implies that the error terms of the equations jointly es-
timated varies together hence the bivariate endogenous dummy model appears to be
the appropriate setting for drawing some consistent inference on the impact of prior
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access to micro-credit on migration. Moreover, the sign of the ρ is negative which in-
dicates that it is more likely that individuals will consider the option of not accessing
micro-credit and opt for temporal seasonal migration during the lean period after the
influence of the included factors is accounted for. During the lean period, it is extremely
difficult for the poor to generate income, let alone comply with their loan repayment
scheme. Such an option therefore becomes less attractive and the negative and signif-
icant ρ appears to indicate that not accessing micro-credit and migrating temporarily
during the lean period is a preferable strategy for poor households. Alternatively, un-
explained migration may partially reflect the behavior of people who did not borrow
because of a negative wealth shock in previous lean periods. For these people, bor-
rowing decreases migration by either creating economic opportunities at the origin or
because of the strict repayment rules. Since the take up of micro-credit is quite low in
this region, the latter explanation seems less plausible than the former one.
The main coefficient of interestβ∗1 is found to be positive and highly significant in all
the estimations, which implies that, net of observable and unobservable confoundings,
people with prior access to micro-credit are more likely to migrate seasonally during
the lean period. One possible explanation for this finding could be the fact that poor
households are more likely to access micro-credit because of their credit constraints
during the productive part of the year, and these households are more likely to migrate
seasonally in the lean season to repay the weekly installments of the loan. The exist-
ing framework of the micro-credit contract in Bangladesh is such that all the borrowing
group members have to be present at each weekly meeting and repay their weekly in-
stallments even in the lean season. Individuals can bypass this strict rule by accessing
micro-credit through a capable female member of the household; however, the respon-
sible borrowing family member is still liable for repaying the weekly installments even
in the lean season when the chief bread-earner is jobless. In this case, one rational
option for that head of household is to migrate during the lean season and send remit-
tances to home to repay the loan installments. An alternative explanation for such a
positive influence of borrowing on migration could be the unobservable poverty and
negative wealth shocks which have affected individuals in previous lean periods. As a
LATE (Local Average Treatment Effect), the positive effect of borrowing in the migra-
tion equation reflects the effect of borrowing as explained by poverty. At low levels of
wealth, additional wealth due to borrowing enables a household to pay the fixed cost of
migrating (e.g., the bus ticket). Another explanation could be that borrowers of micro-
credit are high ability or risk-loving individuals who would be more likely to access
credit from the MFIs during the normal season and would like to migrate during the
lean season for better earnings. It could also mean that simply having access to credit
is not sufficient to tackle the income shock during the lean season, hence individuals
need to migrate to earn extra money for survival.
In the recursive bivariate probit model, the conditional marginal effects are more in-
tuitive than the typical marginal effects. Using model 1, the predicted probability that
a person seasonally migrates given that (s)he already has prior access to micro-credit is
46.1 percent at the reference point. STATA estimations of marginal effects are the sum-
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mation of the direct and the indirect effects of the regressors. Combining direct and
indirect effects, an additional increase of kinship variable from 0 to 1, the conditional
predicted probability of migration increases by some 46 percent, holding all other vari-
ables constant at their means.
An interesting relationship between a household’s access to micro-credit and pre-
dicted probabilities of migration is shown in Figure 2. Here, we have created a graph
of a representative individual as a base case. The individual is a male, with family size
of 5 and mean land holdings, who has no kinship at the destination of migration, has
no education and is affected by flood. The figure reflects that migration propensity is
observably higher for such an individual who has accessed micro-credit at the lower
age level when compared with one who has not accessed micro-credit. However, such
observable difference drastically decreases as age progresses. This demonstrates the
vulnerability of the aged individuals who become less productive and need to migrate
during the lean season for survival.
FIGURE 2: Cumulative predicted probabilities based on head of the household’s age
5.3 Robustness Check
To test for the robustness of our estimations, this paper employed both linear and non-
linear models which are usually estimated by a two-stage process. All the models es-
timated in table 5 are consistent and show similar results to the main specification in
table 4. The first model we estimated is a limited dependent variable model estimated
with two-step feasible GMM estimation technique. However, this model is not appro-
priate in our case since it does not account for the correlation between the two error
terms, and as a result the estimates using LDV will be less efficient. Also, for more than
20% of the observations, the predicted probabilities do not range between zero and one.
Column 2 has the estimations for the treatment-effects model which is estimated using
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the full information maximum likelihood method. Column 3 and 4 have the simple
OLS and probit estimations with the Mills-ratio procedure for controlling for the endo-
geneity of treatment effect, which is the access to micro-credit in our estimations. In
both of these estimations, we find evidence of positive and significant sample selection
terms which means that simple OLS estimation and probit estimates will have upward
bias compared to the main estimation result. Such bias is consistent with our earlier dis-
cussion that the estimated impact of access to micro-credit in the single probit model
might be affected by the endogeneity due to the fact that poor households are more
likely to access micro-credit. Since such households are more likely to migrate sea-
sonally during the lean period, this type of endogeneity should cause an upward bias.
Finally in column 5, we have the instrumental variable (IV) probit estimates by using
the maximum likelihood procedure. Though the estimates show consistency with our
preferred model, IV-Probit model is not applicable in our causal story since IV-Probit
assumes that the endogenous regressors are continuous and are thus not appropriate
for use with discrete endogenous regressors.
[Table 5 about here]
6 Concluding Remarks
We find that economic and individual characteristics play an important role in migra-
tion decisions. Among the economic factors, seasonal hardship has a significant effect.
Personal characteristics, such as sex, and the role of networks are significant at less than
the 5% level of significance.
This study has found systemic differences between seasonal migration and perma-
nent internal migration. To the author’s knowledge, existing empirical studies on per-
manent internal migration have found that education has a significant positive impact
on migration. In this study, we find a reverse relationship. Seasonal migration is tem-
porary in nature and, as a result, individuals who have relatively better education will
tend to choose permanent over temporary migration.
This study finds evidence that temporary internal migration in the lean period is an
efficient coping strategy that individuals in rural areas use to overcome income shock in
the lean period. However, seasonal migration is not an efficient long-term sustainable
solution to the seasonal downturns suffered in the agricultural sector vis-a`-vis village
level poverty. Temporary migration can provide short-time economic benefits to mi-
grants, their families and their villages, but such movements may not be possible over
the years.
Micro-credit schemes have increased the opportunities for rural people to access the
informal credit market. One could reasonably assume that individuals who have direct
or indirect access to micro-credit (through family members) could be involved in both
firm and non-firm activities and be less likely to suffer from seasonality, and therefore
less likely to migrate during the lean period. However, our results suggest that peo-
ple with prior access to micro-credit are more likely to migrate seasonally during the
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lean period. Furthermore, we find that unexplained migration has a significant neg-
ative association with unexplained access to micro-credit which could plausibly indi-
cate an individual’s unobserved preference for the option of not accessing micro-credit
and opting for temporal seasonal migration during the lean period. One plausible ex-
planation for this finding could be the existing micro-credit borrowing framework in
Bangladesh. MFIs have a very strict policy of loan repayments and usually collect re-
payment on a weekly basis. As a result, if the male member of the household takes
credit during the lean period, he will lose his mobility and be unable to undertake mi-
gration due to the strict repayment rules. In many cases, the credit is received by the
female member of the household but is used by the male member who migrates to the
urban areas during the lean season and sends remittances to repay the loan. We have
to consider that not all borrowers of micro-credit are capable of using this strategy and
a sizable number of female-headed households, elderly and disabled people will be
restricted with regard to migration if they have taken credit. MFIs might therefore con-
sider relaxing the loan repayment scheme during the lean period, as this would help
to increase rural incomes and the ability to repay loans. Moreover, the results suggest
that MFIs and governments should provide more support to adult education and the
development of diverse skills (both non-agricultural and agricultural) as well as sup-
porting the provision of job-related information and credit facilities which will help
poor migrants during lean seasons, thus alleviate the social problems associated with
seasonality in the rural areas in a sustainable way.
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A Appendix
TABLE 1: Variable description
Name Description
Migration decision A dummy variable that equals one if the individual migrated in
the last lean season and zero otherwise.
Seasonal hardship A dummy variable that equals one if the individual has one meal
or less on a typical day in the lean period, zero otherwise.
Access to Micro-
credit
A dummy variable, which is coded as one for having access to
Micro-credit through any MFIs, zero otherwise.
Flood A dummy variable that equals one if the respondent has been
affected by flood, and zero otherwise.
Age Actual age of the respondent.
Sex Sex is coded as one if the respondent is male and zero if she is
female.
Marital status A dummy variable, coded as one for those who are married and
zero otherwise.
Education A dummy variable, coded as one for those who have any educa-
tion, zero otherwise.
Household size Number of family members.
Kinship at the place
of destination
A dummy variable, coded as one for those who have kinsmen at
the potential place of destination, zero otherwise.
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TABLE 2: Descriptive statistics
Migration decision = 0 Migration decision= 1 Full sample
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Kinship at the migration destination (d) 0.056 0.230 0.730 0.445 0.521 0.500
Sex (1 if male) 0.767 0.425 0.955 0.208 0.897 0.305
Access to Micro-credit (d) 0.233 0.425 0.175 0.381 0.193 0.395
Total amount land (in decimals) 26.839 50.301 15.600 29.719 19.088 37.610
Education (zero if no education) 0.600 0.493 0.350 0.478 0.428 0.496
Seasonal hardship (d) 0.556 0.500 0.620 0.487 0.600 0.491
Age (in years) 37.567 12.028 40.540 12.672 39.617 12.531
Flood (d) 0.489 0.503 0.495 0.501 0.493 0.501
Marital Status (d) 0.722 0.450 0.690 0.464 0.700 0.459
Size of the Household 5.111 1.41 4.86 1.272 4.938 1.319
Observation 90 200 290
Note: (d) stands for dummy variable
TABLE 3: Cross Tabulation of Seasonal Migration and Access to Micro-credit
Access to Micro-credit = 0 Access to Micro-credit = 1 Total
Seasonal Migration = 0 69 21 90
Seasonal Migration = 1 165 35 200
Total 234 56 290
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TABLE 4: Endogenous Bivariate probit with Instrumental variables [Equation 2]
Dependent Variable: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Migration decision Coefficient M.E. Coefficient M.E. Coefficient M.E. Coefficient M.E.
Male 0.928** 0.115 0.935** 0.127 0.968*** 0.126 0.985*** 0.161
(0.382) (0.384) (0.372) (0.364)
Age 0.057 0.109 0.057 0.116 0.052 0.094 0.048 0.116
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.050)
Age2 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Education -0.549*** -0.817 -0.549*** -0.818 -0.565*** -0.829 -0.551*** -0.833
(0.211) (0.211) (0.206) (0.203)
Size of the Family 0.054 -0.007 0.060 -0.028 0.047 -0.004 0.058 -0.005
(0.079) (0.078) (0.079) (0.080)
Access to Micro-credit 0.979** 0.447 0.959** 0.443 0.955** 0.427 0.896** 0.416
(0.434) (0.438) (0.423) (0.419)
Per Capita Land -0.006 0.003 -0.005 0.004 -0.005 0.005
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Flood -0.006 -0.008 -0.001 -0.006 0.016 0.001 0.007 0.001
(0.196) (0.197) (0.202) (0.205)
Kinship 1.559*** 0.461 1.576*** 0.480 1.593*** 0.470 1.650*** 0.527
(0.406) (0.403) (0.383) (0.371)
Total amount of Land -0.002 0.001
(0.002)
Marital Status -0.275 0.001 -0.230 0.006
(0.215) (0.218)
Seasonal Hardship 0.241 0.036
(0.197)
Constant -2.667** -2.69** -2.41** -2.576**
(1.115) (1.116) (1.133) (1.139 )
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Correlation between errors: ρ̂ -0.855** -0.846** -0.840** -0.817**
H0: Coefficient of IVs are zero 41.06*** 75.53*** 46.55*** 42.44***
Observation 290 290 290 290
Log likelihood -224.686 -224.476 -222.899 -221.978
Note: Values in the parentheses are the cluster adjusted robust standard errors. M.E. stands for marginal effects which
have been calculated at the mean. Significance code: ***1%, ** 5%, * 10%. The variables used in the first stage regres-
sion are the instrumental variables as well as all the explanatory variables (except Kinship and regional dummies).
Instruments are exclusion restriction as well as age, age2, family size, education and sex interacted with the exclusion
restriction; following the work of Pitt and Khandker (1998), Khandker (2005) and (Khandker et al. 2009, pp. 207)
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TABLE 5: Robustness Check [Equation 2]
Linear Model Non-Linear Model
Dependent variable: LDV Treatment Mills Ratio IV Probit
Migration decision GMM FIML OLS Probit MLE
Male 0.191** 0.255*** 0.240*** 1.061*** 0.550
(0.096) (0.087) (0.079) (0.393) (0.487)
Age 0.029* 0.016 0.023* 0.086 0.066
(0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.058) (0.044)
Age2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Education -0.147*** -0.139*** -0.145*** -0.697*** -0.425*
(0.057) (0.045) (0.041) (0.208) (0.250)
Size of the Family 0.022 0.009 0.009 0.073 0.077
(0.028) (0.023) (0.022) (0.091) (0.071)
Access to Micro-credit 0.706** 0.292** 0.518** 1.941** 1.667**
(0.317) (0.135) (0.227) (0.963) (0.717)
Per Capita Land -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.007)
Kinship 0.499*** 0.524*** 0.497*** 2.070*** 1.278**
(0.061) (0.063) (0.048) (0.273) (0.585)
Flood -0.041 -0.004 -0.002 0.013 -0.039
(0.063) (0.052) (0.051) (0.240) (0.178)
Kurigram 0.158* 0.100 0.090 0.472 0.443
(0.092) (0.073) (0.076) (0.332) (0.285)
Chilmari 0.065 0.042 0.030 0.308 0.259
(0.077) (0.057) (0.059) (0.288) (0.231)
Ulipur -0.064 0.022 0.012 0.027 -0.122
(0.095) (0.071) (0.074) (0.305) (0.247)
Constant -0.574 -0.256 -0.418 -3.740** -2.745**
(0.374) (0.292) (0.28) (1.348) (0.999)
Observation 290 290 290 290 290
Log Likelihood -185.243 -222.850 -93.037 -95.343 -224.489
Note: Values in the parentheses are the cluster adjusted robust standard errors. Sig-
nificance code: ***1%, ** 5%, * 10%. The variables used in the first stage regression
are the instrumental variables as well as all the explanatory variables (except Kin-
ship and regional dummies). Instruments are exclusion restriction as well as age,
age2, family size, education and sex interacted with the exclusion restriction.
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